The plan targets the installation of a minimum of 2,500 MW of nuclear power capacity by 2035, with an ambition to increase this to 10,000-12,000 MW by 2045, equivalent to the addition of approximately ten large-scale reactors.\u00b3\u00a0 The government\u2019s pro-nuclear agenda is complemented by legislative and financial initiatives aiming to create a conducive environment for nuclear energy expansion, including streamlined regulatory processes, public financing mechanisms, and risk-sharing strategies.\u2074<\/p>\n
The Swedish nuclear revival, however, is not without its challenges. The success of this plan will depend on co-ordination and addressing issues such as public acceptance, workforce readiness, the economic viability of new nuclear projects, and many others.<\/p>\n
Complicated or complex?<\/h3>\n
These new nuclear projects in Sweden are inherently complicated and complex in their nature due to their expansive scope, high stakes, and extensive interdependencies across multiple actors which increases the uncertainty of projects. These projects \u2013 aimed at delivering critical infrastructure or transformative societal goals \u2013 operate at the intersection of technical, economic, political, and social domains.<\/p>\n
Distinguishing between complicated and complex tasks provides some insights into understanding the Swedish nuclear revival. Inspired by Bruno Latour\u2019s socio-technical detective story of Aramis project,\u2075 complicated and complex tasks have different natures. Complicated ones can be seen as something multifaceted where all of these are known and can be managed stepwise. Complexity builds on the large number of different variables that no one has a clear picture. Complexity, though essential to any large socio-technical system,* often creates unknown outcomes as it lies at the intersection of stakeholders, institutions, and technologies. In the words of Latour,\u2075 while a complex task could render the revival of nuclear energy unfeasible if mismanaged, a complicated task can be addressed through careful planning and co-ordination.<\/p>\n
This paper explores the interplay between complication and complexity in Sweden\u2019s new nuclear initiative to better understand and navigate the challenges ahead. By examining these dynamics and potential solutions, the study provides critical perspectives on whether pursuing new nuclear is the right path for Sweden or if the risks of encountering insurmountable complexity outweigh the potential benefits of realising the government\u2019s plans.<\/p>\n
Complicated tasks of managing new nuclear<\/h3>\n
Launching a second Swedish nuclear programme on the national level is indeed a complicated task, which involves the interplay of diverse actors, evolving technologies, and institutional frameworks. It also demands accelerating the development of licensing processes, establishing clear technology standards, and implementing effective financing mechanisms. Addressing these complications is essential to create a conducive environment for new nuclear. While daunting, these challenges can be overcome with rigorous planning and co-ordination. Here are some of them:<\/p>\n
Expanding and diversifying actor networks<\/h4>\n
Swedish nuclear initiatives rely on the active re-engagement of key actors, including utilities, startups, municipalities, and academia, who are all contributing to the ongoing developmental processes. The stakeholders engaged in new nuclear in Sweden are many, and much more than stakeholders involved during the first wave of Swedish nuclearization during 1965-1985, which resulted in the construction of 12 nuclear reactors in total.** Traditional operators, such as Vattenfall and Fortum, have shifted their focus from maintaining existing reactors to exploring new-build opportunities, also with SMRs. Meanwhile, innovative startups like Blykalla are pioneering next-generation reactor technologies, adding diversity to the nuclear ecosystem. Additionally, municipalities, consultancy firms, and academia are taking more active roles, broadening the actor base and fostering collaboration. Managing this diverse network requires robust mechanisms for co-ordination, knowledge sharing, and conflict resolution, but it also offers opportunities for innovation and resilience.<\/p>\n
Institutional realignment and policy adaptation<\/h4>\n
Institutionally, the revival is underpinned by a series of significant policy shifts, and what can be called \u2018realignment\u2019. The removal of restrictive phase-out legislation, coupled with the introduction of new legislative initiatives and financial mechanisms, marks a paradigm shift, but also opens up space for more work in creation and update of regulatory frameworks. Governmental agencies in Sweden, responsible for nuclear and energy co-ordination and regulation, are not always playing proactive roles in developing and adapting regulatory frameworks. The realignment underscores the need for dynamic policymaking that can adapt to changing technological and market conditions, and governmental agencies need to develop related skills and be resilient enough to handle the institutional complexities. Despite some governmental initiatives, such as the establishment of the role of National Nuclear New-Build Coordinator,\u2076 a single responsible body is far from being enough both to co-ordinate the increasing activities surrounding the new nuclear in Sweden and foster the critical assessment of the potential of emerging nuclear.<\/p>\n
Technological innovation and integration<\/h4>\n
Technologically, the revival encompasses the optimisation of the operational Generation III reactors, construction of new large-scale reactors and the introduction of innovative solutions like SMRs and Generation IIII technologies. While Generation III reactors offer stability and reliability, SMRs introduce modularisation and scalability, enabling diverse applications such as electricity generation, heat production, and hydrogen synthesis. Both of these require integration into existing energy systems, adaptation of regulations, mobilising finances and workforce, and many other components of a large socio-technical system, which will take vast resources and demand time. The challenge for Sweden, as we see it, starts with a lack of clarity regarding the actual goals for Sweden\u2019s new build nuclear programme \u2013 is it facilitating the existing well-known technological solutions (such as Generation III boiling water reactors and light-water reactors) and\/or accommodating the emerging nuclear technologies?<\/p>\n
Growing complexity of tasks of new nuclear<\/h3>\n
The complexity of Sweden\u2019s nuclear revival reflects the natural intricacies of large socio-technical systems. It arises from the interdependence of numerous variables \u2013 technological, social, institutional, and political \u2013 that cannot be separated or resolved in isolation. For example, for new nuclear projects, complexity stems from poorly articulated agenda of diverse actors, regulatory inertia and financial risks, lagging behind institutional frameworks, all compounded by the need to co-ordinate these in an unprecedented energy transition for decarbonisation.<\/p>\n
Regulatory inertia<\/h4>\n
Decades of nuclear phase-out policies in Sweden have resulted in regulatory frameworks that are ill equipped to handle the complexities of new nuclear technologies or new-build projects, but particularly SMRs. Governmental agencies are tasked with adapting corresponding frameworks, but their efforts are hindered by a lack of expertise due to the absence of new nuclear construction since the 1980s. Multiple agendas and varying routines of engaged regulatory stakeholders also does not add to clarity. The delay in establishing clear licensing processes and technology standards creates uncertainty for investors and developers, slowing progress but adding individual (often unspoken) interpretations of the ongoing development.<\/p>\n
Expertise gaps<\/h4>\n
The availability of expertise in nuclear energy, construction, and related fields \u2013 ranging from nuclear engineering to concrete pouring at construction sites and managerial competencies at municipalities \u2013 represents a critical grey area in Sweden\u2019s emerging new nuclear sector. The potential lack of qualified personnel has been widely recognised and highlighted as a pressing challenge, yet there is a limited understanding of the specific numbers and types of qualifications required. This gap is partly due to unspoken agendas and fragmented co-ordination among stakeholders. Moreover, the growing global interest in nuclear energy has created competition for skilled professionals, including those currently in Sweden, who may be drawn to opportunities abroad in the coming years. The ignorance of the urgent need for strategic workforce planning and investment in education and training can potentially lead to more complexity.<\/p>\n
The lock-in of high capital costs and financial risks<\/h4>\n
Nuclear energy projects, both large-scale and modular, require substantial upfront investment. While SMRs are pointed out as a more cost-effective alternative to conventional nuclear plants, the absence of operational SMR projects globally raises concerns about their economic viability. Additionally, the high financial risks associated with long lead times and potential cost overruns present significant barriers. Sweden, on the governmental level, has introduced financing mechanisms as price-hedging agreements and public loans, but their effectiveness in mitigating financial risks remains uncertain.<\/p>\n
At the same time, energy-consuming stakeholders are generally in favour of new nuclear to secure reliability and stability of energy supply, but they are not necessarily willing to express their interests to directly engage in new nuclear developments. Hard-to-abate industries in Sweden prefer \u2018being served\u2019 as electricity consumers, rather than having to secure and participate in the development of the electricity supply themselves. These non-communicated agendas create ambiguities in how other stakeholders behave towards governmental maps, plans, and suggested financial mechanisms of kickstarting upfront investments.<\/p>\n
Political ambiguity<\/h4>\n
While the current pro-nuclear political agenda has catalysed a shift in perception towards nuclear from phase-out to a potential solution to decarbonise, the stakes of \u2018missing out\u2019 are very high. Political instability introduces uncertainty to the current discussions on Sweden\u2019s nuclear future. While the present pro-nuclear agenda has shifted, the long-term commitment required for nuclear energy projects makes them vulnerable to political changes. Shifts in government priorities or public sentiment could influence the trajectory of these discussions, creating a need for adaptable and resilient planning. This volatility creates uncertainty, thus increasing the complexity for long-term nuclear projects, which require consistent policy support, stable financing mechanisms, and a clear regulatory framework.<\/p>\n
Here, it is important to emphasise the need for clear national goals and energy roadmapping to support Sweden\u2019s broader energy transition goals whether including new nuclear or not. Nuclear power is capable to complement intermittent renewable energy sources such as wind and solar, ensuring grid stability and reliability, and providing a stable low-carbon energy supply. However, this approach positions nuclear power not just as a standalone solution but as a component of a resilient and sustainable energy system dependent on clear roadmapping and co-ordination.<\/p>\n
Conclusion: Navigating complexity<\/h3>\n
Understanding the distinction between \u2018complicated\u2019 and \u2018complex\u2019 tasks provides an interesting analytical angle. Complicated tasks, though intricate, can be systematically resolved through clear planning and execution. Complex tasks involve numerous interdependent variables and require adaptive strategies to avoid causing too much ambiguity. In the case of the Swedish nuclear initiative, the key to progress lies in reducing unnecessary complexity and transforming it into manageable complications through careful planning, co-ordination, and prioritisation. Simultaneously, much more attention should be paid to the factors outside of pure technical or financial \u2013 such as communication, regulation, and education.<\/p>\n
Decreasing complexity means, first of all, fostering collaboration among stakeholders, including government agencies, industry leaders, municipalities, and academia, to ensure a unified approach to decision-making. Secondly, clarifying the national energy agenda is equally critical, as it provides a clear vision of nuclear power\u2019s role within the broader energy transition. Finally, investments in education and workforce training are necessary to address skills shortages, enabling the sector to meet future demands.<\/p>\n
By reframing the revival of nuclear energy as a series of manageable challenges rather than insurmountable complexity, stakeholders can navigate the path forward effectively. Whether Sweden ultimately chooses to expand its nuclear capacity or not, this structured approach ensures that the decision is informed, deliberate, and aligned with the country\u2019s energy and sustainability goals.<\/p>\n
This work has been carried out within the framework of the <\/em>ANItA collaboration<\/em><\/a> and has been financially supported by the Swedish Energy Agency under project number 52680-1<\/em><\/p>\n *Note: A large socio-technical system is a complex and interconnected framework that integrates social, technical, and institutional components to deliver essential services or functions at a societal scale.\u2077 Examples of such systems include energy grids, transportation networks, healthcare systems, and telecommunications infrastructures. These systems are characterised by their size, interdependence, and the intricate interplay between human actors and technical components.<\/em><\/p>\n **Note: Out of 14 ever started nuclear reactors, one was never finished (Marviken), one was a research reactor decommissioned in 1964 (\u00c5gesta). Out of the other 12, six are operational (Forsmark 1, 2 and 3, Oskarshamn 3 and Ringhals 3 and 4), while the other six were decommissioned between 1999 and 2020 (Barseb\u00e4ck 1 and 2, Oskarshamn 1 and 2, and Ringhals 1 and 2).<\/em><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.innovationnewsnetwork.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/01\/ANItA-logo_web-300x169.jpg\"){kind=logo}
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